The object of this communication is to reflect on the recent article by James Stieb in relation to an earlier article by Selvan.

The world is facing an apparently increasing dose of violence. Obviously, there cannot be a simple solution to this complex problem. But at the same time it may be appreciated that, in the interests of humanity, a solution must be pursued in every possible way by everyone. This article is concerned with what one could possibly do at the academic level. Since lack of openness of thought appears to be a fundamental contributor to this unfortunate problem, attempting to cultivate this (...) quality at all levels can perhaps go a long way towards making our earth a better place to live in. With science and engineering education, how can one possibly blend this concern? History of science and the subject of measurement uncertainty may present the necessary scope to the educator to discuss with the students the desirability and necessity of this quality. (shrink)

The online version of the original article can be found under doi:10.1007/s11948-007-9036-3.

The online version of the original article can be found under doi:10.1007/s11948-007-9036-3.

Authors such as Krishnasamy Selvan argue that “all human endeavors including engineering and science” have a single primary objective: “bettering humanity.” They favor discussing “the history of science and measurement uncertainty.” This paper respectfully disagrees and argues that “human endeavors including engineering and science” should not pursue “bettering humanity” as their primary objective. Instead these efforts should first pursue individual betterment. One cannot better humanity without knowing what that means. However, there is no one unified theory of what (...) is to the betterment of humanity. Simultaneously, there is no one field (neither science, nor engineering, nor philosophy) entitled to rule univocally. Perhaps if theorists tended their own gardens, the common weal would be tended thereby. (shrink)

Logic; Islamic philosophy; Islam--doctrines.

Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527-Criticism and interpretation ; Political science-Translating.

Byzantine Empire; economic and social conditions; history.

In this paper we examine C. I. Lewis's view on the roleof coherence – what he calls ''congruence'' – in thejustification of beliefs based on memory ortestimony. Lewis has two main theses on the subject. His negativethesis states that coherence of independent items ofevidence has no impact on the probability of a conclusionunless each item has some credibility of its own. Thepositive thesis says, roughly speaking, that coherenceof independently obtained items of evidence – such asconverging memories or testimonies – raises (...) the probabilityof a conclusion to the extent sufficient for epistemicjustification, or, to use Lewis's expression, ''rationaland practical reliance''.It turns out that, while thenegative thesis is essentially correct, astrong positive connection between congruence andprobability – a connection of the kind Lewis ultimatelyneeds in his validation of memory – is contingent on thePrinciple of Indifference. In the final section we assess therepercussions of the latter fact for Lewis's theory in particularand for coherence justification in general. (shrink)

Peirce earned his keep making measurements, mainly of gravity but also astronomical, and he made several contributions to the science of measurement. It has been said that his experience measuring had philosophical consequences: his adoption of fallibilism, his argument against necessitarianism, and his conception of inquiry as converging on the truth have all been mentioned. But not much attention has been paid to the curious episode of his making “the study of great men” part of a course in logic: students (...) were asked to rank a long list of men by order of greatness. That was at Johns Hopkins in 1883. I shall argue that that study, together with his reflections on pre-instrumental estimates of stars’ brightness, bears directly on the method of phaneroscopy formulated nearly two decades later. In each case, the problem is to show how objectivity is possible under conditions in which it must seem that objectivity is impossible. (shrink)

ch. 1. Istorii︠a︡ sot︠s︡iologicheskikh ucheniĭ -- ch. 2. Nauchnai︠a︡ teorii︠a︡ obshchestva.

This book is remarkable for what it does not do. It purports to be about Peirce's opposition to nominalism, but it never states clearly what nominalism is and says little about Peirce's realist alternative. It contains no historical discussion of nominalism and thus does not explain the relation of Peirce's idiosyncratic use of that term to its original meaning. It ignores the secondary literature on that topic and does not even list Rosa Mayorga's highly relevant 2007 book, From Realism to (...) Realicism [sic], in its Bibliography. Nor, despite nominalism's alleged 'threat,' does it make reference to such important recent nominalists as Nelson Goodman or W.V.O. Quine. Indeed, after page one, there is hardly any.. (shrink)